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THE GREAT LAKES AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL HERITAGE
OF HUMANKIND: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE
A. Dan Tarlock*
Since 1985, the eight Great Lakes states and the Canadian provinces of Ontario
and Quebec have cooperated to prevent almost all diversions of water from the
Great Lakes basin. In 2005, the eight states signed an Agreement to create a tiered
system of reviews for diversions and a draft interstate Compact, which creates a
binding process to regulate diversions. This cooperation is primarily a state initia-
tive, supported by the federal governments in both countries, which has paid little
attention to the international character of the lakes. This Essay argues that there
are three major benefits to the region from the incorporation of international envi-
ronmental law into the anti-diversion regime. First, the recent Compact is an
important recognition of the Lakes as a common heritage of human kind. Second,
the success of the regime will be aided by the involvement of the International Joint
Commission (IJC) in diversion issues because of its broader perspective on Great
Lakes issues. Third, international law serves as an additional buffer against the
invocation of international and domestic free trade laws to unravel the proposed
environmental-navigation protection regime.
INTRODUCTION
In the 1980s, the eight Great Lakes states and two littoral
Canadian provinces began cooperating to develop a proposed
legal regime to prohibit most diversions of water out of the Great
Lakes watershed. This cooperation has produced two important
soft law agreements' and a draft interstate compact 2 among the
eight Great Lakes states, Ontario, and Quebec. The latest
agreements, the 2005 Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Sustainable
Water Resources Agreement ("Agreement") , along with the
proposed Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Water Resources
Compact ("Compact") , virtually prohibit all diversions from a
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, A.B. 1962, LL.B. 1965, Stanford
University.
1. GREAT LAKES SUSTAINABLE WATER RESOURCES AGREEMENT (2005), http://
www.mnr.gov.on.ca/mnr/water/greatlakes/GLBASINSUSTAINABLE_WATERRESOUR
CESAGREEMENT_6-30-05.pdf [hereinafter AGREEMENT]; COUNCIL OF GREAT LAKES Gov-
ERNORS, PRINCIPLES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF GREAT LAKES WATER RESOURCES (1985),
http://www.dec.state.ny.us/website/greatlakes/glchartr.pdf [hereinafter CHARTER].
2. GREAT LAKES BASIN WATER RESOURCES COMPACT (2005), http://
www.mnr.gov.on.ca/mnr/water/greatlakes/GREAT LAKESBASINWATERRESOURCES_
COMPACT_6-30-05.pdf [hereinafter COMPACT].
3. See AGREEMENT, supra note 1.
4. See COMPACT, supra note 2.
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Great Lakes sub-watershed to a watershed outside of the Great
Lakes watershed. With the exception of Michigan, the watershed
boundaries do not encompass the entire territory of a state.
Therefore, limited exceptions exist for those communities located
just outside the watershed, but these exceptions will be difficult to
invoke.5 State and provincial cooperation has been supported by
U.S. federal acquiescence in an anti-diversion regime and more
actively by the cooperation of the Canadian national government.
For example, in 2002, Canada enacted a law that prohibits virtually
all diversions from her portion of the Great Lakes either by
traditional conveyances or bulk tanker transport," and if the
Compact is approved, Ontario and Quebec will adopt parallel
legislation.
However, the true significance of the Agreement and Compact
are not in the anti-diversion regime, which will seldom, if ever, be
invoked. Rather, the proposed and existing hard and soft laws ef-
fectively prioritize ecosystem conservation, along with
complementary navigation uses, as the highest use of the Lakes.
The net result of this dedication is an increasing recognition, espe-
cially in Canada,8 that the Lakes are a heritage resource that should
be conserved for the benefit of present and future generations.9
This remarkable dedication to ecosystem conservation of the
Lakes is a happy accident of two domestic political factors in Can-
ada and the United States. First, there are no foreseeable
competing consumptive uses. The costs, low present value of the
water in the Lakes, and environmental problems ensure that for
the foreseeable future there will be no serious efforts to pipe water
from the Lakes to the more arid regions of either Canada or the
United States or to move it by tanker to other countries. ° Thus, the
5. See Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in
the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 405, 424-48 (2006) (discussing the background of
the Agreement and Compact).
6. International Boundary Waters Treaty Act, R.S., ch. 1-20 (2002).
7. See Bob Kelleher Minnesota Considers Plan to Keep Great Lakes Waters in Great Lakes
(Minnesota Public Radio broadcast Feb. 11 2007), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/
display/web/2007/02/09/gtlakescompact.
8. See SIERRA CLUB OF CANADA, THE GREAT LAKES PRIMER: A CITIZEN'S PRIMER
TO PROTECT THE GREAT LAKES AND THE ST. LAWRENCE RIVER (2005), http://
www.sierraclub.ca/national/great-lakes/great-lakes-primer.pdf.
9. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT
LAKES: FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 35-36
(2000) (The Lakes are "a central feature of the natural and cultural heritage of the Great
Lakes region.") http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/html/finalreport.html.
10. See generally PETER ANNIN, THE GREAT LAKES WATER WARS (2006) (describing the




usual political opposition to environmental protection does not
exist in the region. Second, the protection of the Lakes from phan-
tom diversions makes for good domestic politics on both sides of
the border. Canadian nationalist greens have supported a strong
anti-diversion regime by stoking the traditional fear that the
United States is always poised to grab and export all of Canada's
natural resources, including its abundant clean water, which has
resulted in strong national and provincial anti-diversion legisla-
tion.1' In the United States, the continued erosion of political
power in the Great Lakes region, as the nation's population drifts
south and west,12 has provided the necessary urgency for the eight
Basin states to maintain the Lakes as a functioning ecosystem in a
way that they hope will be difficult to change as the Basin's federal
political power erodes.
This happy accident has led to a positive example of enlightened
international water management, but the process by which the
Lakes have been dedicated to environmental protection presents a
striking paradox. The Lakes are international waters,' 3 but the
protection did not take the form of an amendment to the
Boundary Waters Treaty of 190914 or a new bi-national agreement
under the Treaty, such as the 1978 Canada-United Water Quality
Agreement. 15 Throughout the process, the international character
of the Lakes has been consistently, albeit reflexively reaffirmed, but
11. See generally MAUDE BARLOW & TONY CLARK, BLUE GOLD: THE FIGHT TO STOP COR-
PORATE THEFT OF THE WORLD'S WATER (2002) (describing the loss of government control
over water resources that will result from the use of international trade laws and corporate
control of water).
12. TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, TCRP REPORT 74: COSTS OF SPRAWL 67
(2000) (projecting a 13.5 percent population gain for the Midwest versus gains of 27.2 and
33.4 respectively in the South and West), http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/tcrp/
tcrprpt_74-a.pdf.
13. Sharon A. Williams, Public International Law and Water Quality Management in a
Common Drainage Basin: The Great Lakes, 18 CASE W. REs.J. INT'L L. 155, 155 (1985). Techni-
cally, the Great Lakes are bi-national waters; the Boundary Waters Treaty classifies the Lakes
as either boundary waters or tributary waters. Treaty Between the United States and Great
Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit.,
Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448. Lake Michigan is a tributary water. Richard B. Bilder, Controlling
Great Lakes Pollution: A Study in United States-Canadian Environmental Cooperation, 70 MICH. L.
REv. 469, 482 (1972). Thus, diversions, such as the Chicago diversion, are not subject to the
Treaty, since the city of Chicago, located on the shore of Lake Michigan, diverts water only
from Lake Michigan. However, subsequent agreements include the entire Great Lakes sys-
tem, including Lake Michigan, tributary rivers, and associated ground water. See, e.g., Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement, U.S.-Can., Nov. 22, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 1384.
14. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters
Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Star. 2448 [hereinaf-
ter Boundary Waters Treaty].
15. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 13.
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largely ignored in actual decision-making. International law,
including the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, has played a
minimal role in the development of the Agreement and Compact.
Instead, from the 1980s to the present, the United States process
has been under the almost exclusive control of the individual
states, although the states have cooperated closely with Ontario
and Quebec. 16 The U.S. Congress has merely endorsed state
efforts." The Canadian national government, with its weaker
central authority, has more jealously asserted its power to decide
the fate of the Lakes under the foreign affairs power of the
Canadian constitution.
8
The failure to follow traditional international forms or to stress
the international character of the Lakes does not necessarily com-
promise their international character. The important outcome is
that the Lakes are protected for future generations, and one can
argue that the process is superior to an international law approach.
Professor Noah Hall has characterized the Agreement and Com-
pact as a praiseworthy experience in U.S. horizontal cooperative
federalism and argues:
In the United States, the cooperative horizontal federalism
approach is uniquely able to incorporate the international
concerns for the Great Lakes demonstrated by the Boundary
Waters Treaty (through consultation with the Canadian prov-
inces and congressional approval), while encouraging state
participation in comprehensive water management that may
not be politically possible through a federally negotiated in-
ternational treaty.19
There is much merit in this argument, but this Essay argues that
there are at least three potential benefits from the greater recogni-
tion of the international character of the Lakes. Each benefit is
highly contested and problematic in theory and practice, but a
greater recognition of the international dimension of the Lakes
can strengthen domestic ecosystem protection efforts. In descend-
ing order of importance, the three benefits are:
16. INTERNATIONAL WATER USES REVIEW TASK FORCE, PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF
THE GREAT LAKES: THREE YEAR REVIEW 7 (2002). See also DON C. PIPER, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAw OF THE GREAT LAKES: A STUDY OF CANADIAN-UNITED STATES CO-OPERATION (1967)
(tracing the deep roots of the cooperation).
17. See infra notes 24-25.
18. See P.H. PEARSE, F. BERTRAND & J.W. MAcLAREN, CURRENTS OF CHANGE 63-75
(1985) (providing an excellent discussion of federal-provincial powers to manage water).
19. Hall, supra note 5, at 419.
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1. The incorporation of general principles of interna-
tional environmental law into the Great Lakes
governance regime.
2. The involvement of the International Joint Com-
mission (IJC) in diversion issues because of its
broader perspective on Great Lakes issues.
3. The use of international law as an additional buffer
against the invocation of international and domes-
tic free trade laws to unravel the proposed
environmental-navigation protection regime.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ANTI-DIVERSION REGIME
A brief overview of the proposed governance regime is necessary
to provide context for the potential role of international law. In
1985, fears that Lake Superior diversions would be used to bail out
the mined Ogallala Aquifer in the Great Plains produced the Great
Lakes Charter signed by the eight Great Lakes states and the prov-
inces of Ontario and Quebec.20 The Charter is a "soft law" (non-
binding) regime.1 Principle IV of the Charter requires that a signa-
tory state or province notify, consult, and seek the consent of the
other signatories before approving any new or increased diversion
or consumptive use "of the water resources of the Great lakes" of
more than five million gallons over a thirty-day average.22 The
Charter was further implemented or "hardened" by the adoption
of state laws that prohibited all basin diversions, notjust those over
five million gallons per day.23 In 198624 and again in 2000,25 the U.S.
Congress passed legislation which allows the governor of any Great
Lakes state to veto a trans-basin diversion. Since 1985, the Charter
20. See CHARTER supra note 1.
21. In the first litigation to consider the Charter, a federal district court described it as
"a kind of gentleman's agreement between the Governors of the Great Lakes States and the
Provinces of Ontario and Quebec." Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians v. Great
Springs Waters of America, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 2d 853, 858 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (holding the
Charter creates no implied private or Tribal rights).
22. CHARTER, supra note 1, at 5.
23. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.32703 (West 1999); IND. CODE § 14-25-1-11
(1995).
24. Water Resources Planning Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20(d) (1986) (prior to 2000
amendment).
25. Id. (amended 2000).
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has successfully warded off large diversions and developed stan-
dards to evaluate small ones.26
The Agreement and Compact further "harden" the Charter.
They divide proposed withdrawals into four different tiers. 7 Under
the Agreement, states will exercise primary regulatory authority for
smaller withdrawals.28 For larger withdrawals, regional consultation
or review is required. 29 The state must give notice to other states
and allow comments for mid-range diversions.30 Diversions of five
million gallons per day are subject to a non-binding regional re-
view process and must be approved by a unanimous vote of the
Great Lakes governors.3' In addition, larger withdrawals must meet
common basin-wide standards. The June 2005 draft of the Com-
pact3 3 divides withdrawals into four major categories. New and
increased diversions, which are defined as transfers of water out-
side the Great Lakes basin or between the watersheds of one Lake
to another, are prohibited subject to limited exceptions. 4 New or
increased intra-basin withdrawals under 100,000 gallons per day
over a ninety-day period are regulated only by the jurisdiction from
which they originate. 3 Proposed intra-basin uses between 100,000
and five million gallons over a ninety-day period must meet strin-
gent basin-wide standards. 6 Withdrawals over five million gallons
over a ninety-day period must meet the same standards and are
subject to regional review.3' The only inter-basin transfers allowed
are those for cities or counties that straddle the Basin.38 One of the
major political issues in the diversion debate was the question of
whether small, trans-basin diversions should be allowed.39 Water-
26. See James P. Hill, The New Politics of Great Lakes Water Diversion: A Canada-Michigan
Interface, 2 TOL. J. GREAT LAKEs' L. Se. & POL'v 75, 80 (1999) (citing the proposed anti-
diversion regime as a prime example of the states to bypass the federal government in en-
gaging with other national governments as well sub-units); see a/sojulian G. Ku, Gubernatorial
Foreign Policy, 115 YALE L.J. 2380, 2398-2413 (2006) (arguing that the states have consider-
able discretion to act and that federal preemption should be the primary check on state
initiatives). But see Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374-88 (2000) (re-
serving the foreign affairs exclusively to the federal government); Zschernig v. Miller, 389
U.S. 429, 432-41 (1968).
27. AGREEMENT, supra note 1, § 201(2); COMPACT, supra note 2, § 4.7(2).
28. AGREEMENT, supra note 1, §§ 201(2), 205.
29. AGREEMENT, supra note 1, §§ 201 (2) (c), 204.
30. AGREEMENT, supra note 1, §§ 201 (2) (b) (iv), 503.
31. AGREEMENT, supra note 1, § 201(2)(c); COMPACT, supra note 2, § 4.7(2)(c).
32. COMPACT, supra note 2, § 4.7(2) (b).
33. Id. §§ 4.6-4.8.
34. Id. § 4.6.
35. Id. § 4.8.
36. Id. § 4.7 (2) (b).
37. Id. § 4.7(2) (c).
38. Id. § 4.6.
39. See SIERRA CLUB OF CANADA, supra note 8, at 6.
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shed boundaries, do not follow political boundaries, and in many
areas, the Great Lakes basin extends only a few miles or less from
the shore of a Lake. In these areas, or where there is a difference
between the surface and groundwater boundary, there can be
great pressure for the use of Lake water if local supplies are de-
pleted or contaminated. The question is whether such diversions
should be allowed and if so, under what conditions.0 Originally,
the governments of the eight basin states thought that such diver-
sions should be allowed under conditions that included a
"resource improvement" standard.4' Such a standard, modeled on
United States wetland mitigation policy, 42 would have allowed eco-
system improvements to offset diversions. The kind and location of
the improvements occupied the time of consultants but the gover-
nors and premiers took the idea no further.
On the whole, the two Canadian provinces, the national gov-
ernment of Canada, and Canadian national greens thought that
diversions should only be permitted if there were a "no net loss"
standard. There was great concern that the resource improve-
ment standard "commodified" the Lakes and would pave the way
for diversions and bulk water transport.44 In addition, the standard
40. The current focus is on rapidly growing Waukesha County, Wisconsin. The county
lies just outside the Great Lakes watershed, although there is some evidence that the area's
groundwater pumping has reserved the flow of the aquifer and may actually be drawing
water that would otherwise reach Lake Michigan. Dan Egan, Water Pressures Divide a Great
Lakes State, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, Nov. 30, 2003, at IS.
41. The 2000 amendment to the 1986 Water Resources Planning Act required the
states to develop a decision-making standard that included "resource improvement." 42
U.S.C. § 1962d-20(b) (2). A 1999 legal opinion recommended that the Great Lakes states
and provinces adopt a diversion standard to avoid a court holding that the Water Resources
Planning Act of 1986 was an unconstitutional delegation of power. ANNIN, supra note 10, at
198-207. The opinion suggested that the states and provinces adopt a "resource improve-
ment" standard that would allow an activity, such as the restoration of a water-related
ecosystem, to offset the adverse environmental impacts of a withdrawal. Id. at 206. Canadian
environmentalists objected to the recommendation because it opened the door to increased
diversions. Id. at 218. Industrial users objected to having to pay for the use of the Lakes that
have historically been an open access commons. Id. The standard was dropped without a
word of explanation from theJuly 2005 Annex 2001 Draft.
42. See WILLIAM WANT, LAW OF WETLANDS REGULATION §§ 6:36-44 (2006) (stating that
Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2007), allows the
filling of natural wetlands in return for the preservation of other natural ones or the crea-
tion of new ones).
43. SIERRA CLUB OF CANADA, supra note 8, at 8.
44. INTERNATIONAL WATER USES REVIEW TASK FORCE, supra note 16 (detailing the
three part strategy that the federal government of Canada adopted in 1999 for Great Lakes
diversions). The federal government of Canada amended the Boundary Waters Treaty Act,
joined with the United States in the 1999 reference to the IJC on diversions, and sought
provincial endorsement of a Canada-wide ban on bulk water removals. Id. at 18.
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45raised all of the problems of valuing ecosystems services. This po-
litical gap was considerably narrowed when the Council of Great
Lakes Governors withdrew a draft that included a resource im-
provement standard and issued the final standard that omitted it."46
II. THE INCORPORATION OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The major advantage of viewing the Agreement and Compact
through the lens of international environmental law is that the
area has developed fundamental principles based on modern sci-
ence and ethics. Canadian and U.S. environmental law tends to be
media or resource specific and resistant to the incorporation of
new scientific understanding and ethical ideas. Thus, international
law principles are better adapted to the actual problems faced by
stressed resources and provide the necessary general standards for
conservation. International environmental law is evolving from the
simple negative rule that no state should harm another to the af-
firmative duty of environmentally sustainable development.
47
Environmentally sustainable development, vague as it is, posits that
governments must act as resource stewards for present and future• 41
generations. Of all the ethical principles put forth in recent years,
the emerging global consensus that we must replace the Greco-
Judeo-Christian tradition that humankind is a despot over nature
49
45. See generally James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystems Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887 (1997)
(providing a general description of valuation of ecosystem services).
46. SeeAGREEMENT, supra note 1.
47. See EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
325-28 (2d ed. 2007).
48. See DAN TARLOCK, ECOSYSTEMS, CHAPTER 24 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2007).
49. JOHN PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE 28-40 (1974) (remaining the
leading exponent of this position). Many people now read the first book of Genesis as sup-
porting environmentally sustainable development through the duty to manage the Garden
of Eden without exploit it thoughdessly for human benefit. Id. at 29. The great geographer
Gilbert White has written:
People around the world in the 1990s are perceiving the earth as more than a globe
to be surveyed, or developed for the public good in the short term, or to be pro-
tected from threats to its well-being both human and natural. It is all of these to some
degree, but has additional dimensions. People in many cultures accept its scientific
description as a matter of belief. They recognize a commitment to care for it in per-
petuity. They accept reluctantly the obligation to come to terms with problems posed
by growth in numbers and appetites. This is not simply an analysis of economic and
social consequences of political policies toward environmental matters. The roots are
a growing solemn sense of the individual as part of one human family for whom the
earth is its spiritual home.
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with the principle that we are stewards of the earth5 0 has had the
most impact. At a minimum, stewardship requires that some high
pre-existing baseline condition be maintained over time.
Stewardship includes two important principles: the principle of
inter-generational equity articulated by Professor Edith Brown
Weiss5 and the principle of precaution. Inter-generational equity
permits resource exploitation subject to the constraint that we
leave the resource in no worse condition than when we found it.
The dedication of major ecosystems as the common heritage of
humankind managed with appropriate precaution is a practical
application of the ethic of inter-generational equity and the fun-
damental norm of environmentally sustainable development.
A. The Common Heritage of Humankind
One of the most intractable problems of international environ-
mental law is the imposition of duties on states for the
environmentally sustainable management of internal natural re-
sources whose importance extends beyond national borders.
Resources such as wetlands or aquatic ecosystems are not true
unowned commons that traditionally encompass the high seas and
the upper atmosphere.3 Ecosystem mismanagement also does not
fit the paradigm of transboundary pollution as there is often no
discrete victim.54 As a matter of international law, most ecosystems
are simply the internal territory of a country and decisions regard-
ing use of these ecosystems are wholly within the nation's
discretion as a sovereign. 5 The Law of the Sea produced a new
Gilbert White, Reflections on Changing Perceptions of the Earth, 19 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV'T 1
(1994).
50. See generally ROBIN ATTFIELD, THE ETHICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN (2d ed.
1991) (providing a forceful exposition of this provocative thesis).
51. EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 17-46 (Richard Faulk ed., 1989).
52. Id. at 42.
53. Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1484,
1534-36 (1991) (distinguishing among three categories of global commons: (1) areas within
a single country such as a rain forest that have global impacts, (2) unallocated commons,
and (3) true commons for which the assignment of sovereign rights is impossible).
54. OSCAR SCHACTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 366 (1991)
("The activities within a particular country or under its jurisdiction would not result in in-
ternational environmental harm unless those activities actually had physical effects in
another country or in areas beyond the jurisdiction of any State.").
55. See TARLOCK, supra note 48.
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category of a possible erga omnes duties, 56 protection of the com-
mon heritage of humankind,57 although the concept remains
contested, vague, and seldom explicitly recognized. However, its
application in international environmental law could promote
domestic ecosystem protection.
The concept of common heritage commons originated in Arti-
cle 136 of United Nations Law of the Sea,5S which entered into
force in 1994.59 Article 136 declares that deep-sea beds are "the
common heritage of mankind., 60 At the insistence of non-littoral
nations, the concept was applied only to deep-sea bed mining
rights and only to resources outside the territorial jurisdiction of
any nation.6 ' However, it has evolved, at least in theory, to include
resources both within and outside of national territory.6 ' The most
important application beyond the high seas, which have long been
recognized as outside the ownership of individual nations, is Ant-
arctica.
The Antarctic is not a true global commons, but it is the only
continent whose territory has not been divided among nation
states, although various nations still assert ownership claims. Be-
cause permanent settlement is unfeasible, the post World War II
protection regime agreed upon by the interested nations is moving
toward the recognition that the continent should be conserved as a
global heritage environmental resource. In 1961, the Antarctic
56. See Dan Tarlock, Five Views of the Great Lakes and Why They Might Matter, 15 MINN. J.
INT'L L. 21, 29-32 (2006).
57. See Malgosia A. Fitzmaurice, International Protection of the Environment, 293 RECUEIL
DES COURS 10, 150-61 (2001).
58. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397.
59. WEISS ET AL., supra note 47, at 659 n.27; see Christopher C. Joyne, Legal Implications
of the Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 190 (1986). There are
more distant antecedents. By the 19th century, it was widely recognized that laws of war did
permit a nation to plunder works of art that were part of the national heritage. Wojciech W.
Kowalski, Restitution of Works of Art Pursuant to Private and Public International Law, 288 RE-
CUEIL DES COURS 10, 60 (2001) (arguing that judgments requiring the return of seized art
and statements during the early Nineteenth Century constitute "the birth of the concept of
the common heritage of mankind").
60. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 58, art. 136.
61. See DIVISION OF OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFFICE OF LEGAL AF-
FAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, THE LAW OF THE SEA: CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF
MANKIND -LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ARTICLES 133-50 AND 311 (A) OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 109-23 (1996) (collecting the comments of all coun-
tries, especially developing and non-littoral countries, who insisted on limiting the common
heritage concept to areas beyond the territorial jurisdiction of states).
62. See id.
63. See LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND




Treaty froze the territorial claims of the various states. 4 In the
1980s, attempts to develop a mining regime failed, and the parties
to the Antarctic regime have gradually come to recognize that the
Antarctic should be devoted to research and carefully controlled
tourism.6' The 1991 Madrid Protocol on the Antarctic Environ-
ment expressly imposes a number of stringent assessment and
protection duties on any activity that threatens to damage the con-
tinent's ecosystems.66 In short, Antarctica is now a common
67heritage resource. The Antarctic regime demonstrates the bene-
fits of recognition of the international character of a natural
resource not exclusively within the territory of any one state.
The idea of extraterritorial duties toward areas of global con-
cern can also be extrapolated from Principle 21 of the Stockholm
Declaration, 68 and its affirmation in Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development,69 and the Rio Plus
10 2002 Johannesburg Summit. ° Principle 21 qualifies the sover-
eign right of states to develop their resources by recognizing the
responsibility not to "cause damage to the environment of other
states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."71 The
thrust of Principle 21 is to reaffirm the holding of the Trail Smelter
Arbitration 2 that the foundation of the state duty not to cause pol-
lution in the territory of another state. However, Principle 21 also
modestly extends state responsibility to recognized global com-
mons. 3 Principle 21 does not yet apply to international (let alone
internal) resources where there is no conventional damage from
trans-boundary pollution. Thus, Principle 21 and its subsequent
reaffirmations are not only a precedent for the recognition of a
64. Antarctic Treaty art. 4, Dec. 1, 1959, 19 I.L.M. 860.
65. GURUSWAMY, supra note 63 at 406-09.
66. Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, § 3, Oct. 4, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 1461. See generally Francesco Francioni, The Madrid Protocol on the Protection of the Antarc-
tic Environment, 28 TEx. INT'L LJ. 47 (1993) (analyzing the Madrid Protocol).
67. See Deborah H. Overholt, Enviromental Protection in the Antarctic: Past, Present, and Fu-
ture, 28 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 227, 256-60 (1990).
68. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June
16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1420.
69. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 876.
70. JOHANNESBURG DECLARATION ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT § 8 (2002), http://
www.joburg.org.za/clean-city/johannesburgdeclaration.pdf.
71. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, supra
note 68.
72. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1938, (Trail Smelter Arb.
Trib. 1941).
73. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, supra
note 68.
SUMMER 2007] 1005
1006 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
new erga omnes duty. However, Principle 21 does illustrate that the
concept of state responsibility for environmental degradation is
evolving and expanding.
The international community still resists the extension of the
common heritage principle beyond traditionally recognized
"unowned" common resources. 4 For example, the Preamble to the
1992 Convention on Biological Diversity states only that biological
diversity is a "common concern of humankind," 75 which represents a
rejection of stronger characterizations of the international dimen-
sions of domestic biodiversity that might constrain national
discretion. Nonetheless, the idea of heritage or ecosystems of
common concern continues to evolve through state practice.
The net effect of the protection decisions taken by the Canadian
and U.S. governmental actors is a recognition that the Lakes are a
world heritage resource, or at the very least a constrained natural
resource. The core idea of both categories is that the Lakes are a
non-renewable, functioning system that should be maintained in as
close to its "natural" condition as possible for the benefit of present
and future generations.76
There are other important domestic precedents. For example,
in the Tasmanian Dam Case, the Australian High Court accepted
the World Heritage Convention as a restraint on its internal re-
source use. 77 Australia's weak federal constitution does not give the
Commonwealth government the power to regulate the environ-
ment.7 8 After the state of Tasmania passed legislation authorizing a
dam in a World Heritage temperate rain forest, the federal gov-
ernment passed legislation prohibiting the dam.79 In a 4-3
decision, the High Court held that the Commonwealth govern-
ment's adherence to the Convention allowed it to invoke the
Foreign Affairs clause of the federal constitution as a legitimate
basis for the otherwise unconstitutional legislation. s° Brazil's 1988
adoption of constitutional protection of her rain forests8 1 (ineffec-
tive as it is) is another important precedent.
74. Brazil Marshals Defenses to Fight Amazon Internationalization (ENS Brasilia, April
11, 2005), http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/apr2005/2005-04-11-04.asp. In 2005, the
Brazilian Senate Foreign Relations and National Defense Commission held a public hearing
on the threats posed by the efforts of "the international community" to classify the Amazon
rain forest as "collective public goods." Id. The Fleet Admiral announced that the military
has prepared a strategy of resistance should the region be invaded by a "superior power." Id.
75. Convention on Biological DiversityJune 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 822 (emphasis added).
76. INTERNATIONALJOINT COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 5.
77. Commonwealth of Tasmania v. Australia (1983) 158 C.L.R. 1.
78. See GERRY BATES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 76-77 (4th ed. 1995).
79. Id. at 80.
80. Commonwealth of Tasmania, 158 C.L.R. at 295.
81. Constitui4;do Federal [Constitution] art. 225 4 (Brazil).
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The proposed management regime constitutes a modest but
important "soft law" precedent for the principle that states have a
duty to manage their internal resources for the benefit of present
as well as future generations. This duty is currently neither a per-
emptory jus cogens norm, 2 nor a customary rule. Biodiversity
conservation, despite the existence of the 1992 Convention on the
Conservation of Biodiversity,5 has not yet emerged as a general
practice accepted by states as legally obligatory. 4 In fact, state prac-
tice remains the subordination of biodiversity conservation to
exploitation to promote economic development.85 This said, both
jus cogens and customary rules of international law are not static.
The history of the evolution of the concept of jus cogens and its ap-
plication to the laws of war and human rights illustrate that the
general norms are the result of centuries of painful, cruel, and
bloody experience of nation states.86 A similar learning curve, now
driven by the mounting evidence of the serious impacts of global
climate change, is occurring with respect to environmental degra-
dation at a much faster rate than occurred in the past. As Professor
Edith Brown Weiss has written, although the "recognition of a
moral obligation does not in itself create legal obligations and
rights .... [I]t is a stage in the evolution of the public con-
science."'
82. Jus cogens is a rare species of the general or peremptory norm of international law
that constrains state behavior, including the power to enter into treaties that contravene the
norm. WEISS ET AL., supra note 47, at 137-38. Unlike most international law obligations, erga
omnes obligations are owed by a state to the international community at large. Id. The stan-
dard for the recognition of a jus cogens norm is high; it must be a general norm which has
generally, but not unanimously, been accepted by the nations that make up the interna-
tional community. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 22, 1969. The
norms that exist are generally human rights norms, such as the prohibition of slavery and
genocide, as well as the protection of foreign investment. The International Court ofJustice
recognized erga omnes obligations as a source of international law. See Barcelona Traction,
Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5).
83. See Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 75.
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102(2) (1987). See Thomas
Meron, International Law in the Age of Human Rights, 301 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 373-90
(2003) (discussing the sources of custom).
85. MILLENIuM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: CUR-
RENT STATE AND TRENDS 1-20 (2005) (documenting the continued degradation of a
number of crucial ecosystem functions and services throughout the world).
86. See generally LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS (1988) (providing an
exhaustive development of this thesis).
87. WEISS, supra note 51, at 103.
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B. Precaution
The proposed management regime for the Lakes is equally an
example of the application of the precautionary principle. The
principle can be stated in strong and weak versions 88 but the core
idea is that the state has the power to limit activities that pose a risk
of future harm, although the desired scientific evidence about the
likelihood and magnitude is uncertain and inconclusive. The
United States has, in general opposed the precautionary principle.
The United States sees this principle as a European import with
the dangerous potential to undermine the risk assessment, which is
the scientific foundation of U.S. environmental laws.8 9 Hard ques-
tions, such as the scientific threshold necessary to trigger the
principle, will have to await an actual application, 0 but the scien-
88. The precautionary principle posits that a high degree of certainty about the ad-
verse impacts of an activity is not a necessary prerequisite to limit or regulate it and is one of
the foundations of international environmental law. DANIEL BODANSKY, REMARKS, PANEL ON
NEw DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW, PROCEEDINGS 85TH ANNUAL MEETING, 413, 414 (1991) [on file with
author]. The principle was endorsed in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and De-
velopment. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 69, at 879. The
precautionary principle remains much contested. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of
the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851, 851-925 (1996) (arguing that it is
incoherent and unfair); Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary Principle?, 31 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10790, 10792 (2001). Crucial issues, such as who bears the burden of proof and how
feedback loops should operate, remain unresolved, but properly used, the precautionary
principle is an essential principle of modern ecosystem management.
89. SeeJutta Brun6e, The United States and International Environmental Law: Living with
an Elephant, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 617, 628-30 (2004) (placing United States opposition in the
broader context of the fear of general principles of customary law); Jonathan Weiner, Whose
Precaution After All?: A Comment on the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13
DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 207, 207-62 (2003) (providing the best articulation of this posi-
tion).
90. See Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing
of Biotech Products, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006) (providing one of the fullest considera-
tions of the principle). The Panel decision rejected the EU's formulation, which would have
allowed any doubt, regardless of the scientific foundation, to justify a regulatory action, in
this case a ban on GMOs. Id. As of November 2006, the Panel report has been circulated but
not formally adopted. See KEY FACTS: SUMMARY OF THE DISPUTE TO DATE (2007), http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispue/cases-e/ds292_e.htm. The following summarizes
the Panel's discussion of the status of the precautionary principle:
The EC argued that certain GMOs present potential threats to human health and the
environment. It submitted that the existence of a potential threat justified the as-
sessment of risks on a case-by-case basis and special measures of protection based on
the precautionary principle. Citing several international instruments incorporating
the precautionary principle, the EC asserted that the precautionary principle was now
a fully fledged and general principle of international law.
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tific basis for its incorporation into the management regime for the
Lakes is in place.
The Lakes are a fragile, stressed ecosystem. Although the Lakes
contain vast amounts of water, the current volumes are needed to
perform vital ecological and human services. 9' Thus, changes in
the system, including large and small withdrawals, must be viewed
skeptically. Three examples illustrate the fragility of the system.
First, it takes over one hundred years to flush pollutants through
the system from Lake Superior to the Saint Lawrence.92 Second,
the levels needed to sustain navigation and the grandfathered Chi-
cago diversion are high, and a small drop in surface levels could
impact these services.9 Third, although regional global climate
change scenarios are not consistent, many models suggest lowered
levels and thus re-enforce the need for precaution to maintain the
Lakes in their natural fluctuating cycles.94
CIEL's amicus curiae brief further argued that scientific uncertainty is an essential
component of the precautionary principle. In fact, it was the recognition that science
does not have all the answers in certain circumstances that led to the acknowledge-
ment that uncertainty could not be used to postpone measures that respond to
serious and complex health and environmental problems, and to the development of
the precautionary principle. CIEL also noted that while the precautionary principle
may be worded differently in various instruments-not an uncommon characteristic
in international customary law-the notion of inconclusive scientific evidence is at
the core of each statement.
With respect to the precautionary principle, the Panel found that if the 'precaution-
ary principle' was a general principle of law, it should be taken into account. Noting
that the EC had not explained exactly what it meant by the term 'general principle of
international law,' the panel found that the term could be understood as encompass-
ing either rules of customary law or the general principles of law recognized by States
or both, and that it would consider whether the precautionary principle fit within ei-
ther of these categories. In doing so, the Panel relied primarily on the Appellate
Body's handling of this question in its report in EC-Hormones. In that case, the Ap-
pellate Body, noting that it was unclear whether the precautionary principle has been
widely accepted by Members as a principle of general or customary international law,
refrained from taking position on the status. In line with that approach, the EC-
Biotech Panel also refrained from expressing a view on the issue.
NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER & MARIA JULIA OLIVA, EC-BIOTECH: OVERVIEW AND
ANALYSIS OF THE PANEL'S INTERIM REPORT 47-48 (2006), http://www.ciel.org/
Publications/ECBiotechMar06.pdf.
91. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 15-16.
92. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL & ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA, THE GREAT LAKES
WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT: AN EVOLVING INSTRUMENT FOR ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 2
(1985).
93. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 15-18.
94. See US NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE VARI-
ABILITY AND CHANGE, REGIONAL PAPER: GREAT LAKES (2003), http://
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Maintenance of the status quo is perhaps the best way for the re-
gion to adapt to the risks of climate change. In addition, the
proposed management approach also is an extension of the dec-
ades long efforts of the two countries to improve the quality of the
Lakes. Canada and the United States have adopted an ecosystem
approach to guide pollution control strategies.95 In sum, any dis-
placement of the status quo should be carefully questioned. As the
2000 International Joint Commission (IJC) reference on diversions
concluded, (1) "[i]f all interests in the Basin are considered, there
is never a 'surplus' of water in the Great Lakes system; every drop
of water has several potential uses, and trade-offs must be made
when, through human intervention, waters are removed from the
system" and (2) "[a] ny water taken from the system has to be re-
placed in order to restore the system's lost resilience .... The
precautionary approach dictates that removals should not be au-
thorized unless it can be shown, with confidence, that they will not
adversely affect the integrity of the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem."96
The risks of lower permanent levels as a result of global climate
change only strengthen the case for precaution.
There is, however, a need to cabin a precautionary principle so
that it does not preclude all consumptive uses or block necessary
future changes to the regime. Proponents of the precautionary
principle have argued that opponents of precaution should bear
the burden of rebutting the exercise of the principle, but this bur-
den is too extreme. Such a rule would become a per se prohibition
on any alteration of the status quo. Thus, there is a real possibility
that the precautionary principle could choke off a wide range of
legitimate considerations such as risk-risk trade-offs. It is more sen-
sible to place the burden of justification on the government body
that invokes the principle. This allocation would insure that alter-
native methods of minimizing uncertainty, such as compensation,
have been adequately explored and that the principle is applied to
the most serious and largely irreversible risks. In addition, the idea
that once the principle is invoked to minimize risk, the decision is
permanent should be excised from discussions of the principle.
The decision needs to be linked to the concept of adaptive man-
www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/nacc/education/greatlakes/greatlakes-edu-3.htm (stating that nine
out of ten models predict some lowering of lake levels).
95. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL & ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA, supra note 92
(1985). See generally PERSPECTIVES ON ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT OF THE GREAT LAKES: A
READER (L.K Caldwell ed. 1988) (providing a comprehensive compendium of articles on
ecosystem management in the Great Lakes).
96. INTERNATIONALJOINT COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 36.
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agement.97 The existence of monitoring and adaptive feedback
mechanisms should be a major factor in validating the decision to
limit an activity when the adverse impacts are uncertain. This rea-
soning is especially true for ecosystem management given the
dynamic nature of ecosystems.3
III. THE ADVANTAGES OF INTERNATIONAL
JOINT COMMISSION INVOLVEMENT
The second advantage of focusing on the international charac-
ter of the Lakes is that it can increase the influence of the IJC. For
almost a century, the Commission has played an important role in
the management of the Great Lakes. The IJC was created by the
1909 Boundary Waters Treaty99 and is perhaps the most powerful
and influential bi-national organization in the world because of its
combination of adjudicatory and investigatory powers. At Canada's
insistence, the IJC was given limited adjudicatory powers over di-
versions or obstructions that affect the natural level of the lakes.'00
Article IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty gives the IJC the power to
investigate issues referred to it by the two governments.' l This in-
vestigatory power is the major source of the IJC's influence and is
now its most important function, as adjudication is no longer re-
quested by the two governments. 0 2 In fact, the IJC had its wings
97. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE MISSOURI RIVER ECOSYSTEM: EXPLORING
THE PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY 107-12 (2002) (discussing the concept of adaptive manage-
ment).
98. John M. Blair, Scott L. Collins & Alan K. Knapp, Ecosystems as Functional Units in Na-
ture, 14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 150, 152 (2000).
99. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 14, art. VII.
100. Id. art. III; see L.M. BLOOMFIELD & G.F. FITZGERALD, BOUNDARY WATER PROBLEMS
OF CANADA AND THE U.S. (1958) (providing a more detailed history of the background of
the Treaty); A.D.P. HEENEY, ALONG THE COMMON FRONTIER: THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT
COMMISSION (1967); David LeMarquand, The International Joint Commission and Changing
Canada-United States Boundary Relations, 33 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 59, 62-67 (1993) (providing a
brief history of the background of the Treaty).
101. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 14, art. IX. In theory either country could
submit a reference, but the IJC's consistent practice has been to act only when both coun-
tries agree to refer an issue to it. Noah Hall, Bilateral Breakdown: U.S.-Canada Pollution
Disputes, 21 NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVT'L 18, 19 (2006).
102. Hall, supra note 101, at 19. The Trail Smelter dispute was originally referred to the
IJC, but the United States rejected the recommended award and the dispute was eventually
resolved by a special arbitral tribunal. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 35 Am.J. Int'l
L. 684 (Ad Hoc Int'l Arb. Trib. 1941). In discussing a U. S. CERCLA action against the pre-
sent owners of the smelter, Professor Michael Robinson-Dorn noted that "[tihe Boundary
Waters Treaty contains no provision preempting the application of domestic law." Michael J.
Robinson-Dom, The Trail Smelter: Is What's Past PrologueEPA Blazes a New Rail for CERCLA,
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clipped when it asserted the power to determine its jurisdiction
absent a request to adjudicate or a reference from the two coun-
tries.' ° The practice is now clear: the IJC must await a joint
reference before it acts. Reference reports have often laid the
foundation for Canada-United States cooperation initiatives on
major issues or at least provided broad, relatively neutral analyses
of issues that are superior to studies subject to the immediate pres-
sures of national politics.
Within the confines of bi-national political constraints, the IJC's
principal strengths are its independent and broad comparative ap-
proach to water management derived from its international
character and non-parochial perspectives.14 For example, the IJC's
2000 report, Protection of the Waters of the Great Lakes: Final Report to
the Governments of Canada and the United States,' is an example of
the positive role that the Commission played during the Clinton
administration in helping to shape the policy debate about the fu-
ture of the Great Lakes around environmental issues. The Report
marshaled available scientific evidence to underscore the need for
a strong anti-diversion regime. First, it classified the Lakes as a
"nonrenewable resource."0 6 Initially, this conclusion is surprising,
as nonrenewable resources are usually deep aquifers mined in arid
areas and mineral deposits rather than rain fed water bodies.' 7
However, the Report noted that less than one percent of the total
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 233, 305 (2006); see also Pakootas v. Tech Cominico Metals Ltd., 452 F.3d
1066, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the presumption against the extraterritorial appli-
cation of CERCLA does not apply to hazardous substance releases which come to rest and
cause harm in the United States). However, NGOs continue to argue that the IJC has juris-
diction outside of the reference procedure. The 2006 Submission to the Commission of
Environmental Cooperation, created by the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement, a
group of United States NGOs, asserts that Canada and the United States have failed to en-
force the Boundary Waters Treaty by failing to refer the alleged cross-border pollution from
Devil's Lake, North Dakota to the IJC. Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation, Determination in Accordance with Article 14(1) of the North American Agreement for
Environmental Cooperation, SEM-06-002 (June 8, 2006), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/
06-2-DET14 1-en.pdf. The submission was dismissed because of considerable uncertainty
about whether the Treaty was a law or regulation in either Canada or the United States. Id.
103. LeMarquand, supra note 100, at 75-76.
104. Id. at 77-78 (stating that IJC strengths include independence, impartiality, ability
to accurately synthesize relevant facts, the willingness to incorporate international and envi-
ronmental perspectives into its decisions, and ability to facilitate inter-governmental
consensus).
105. See INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 9.
106. Id. at 5.
107. WILLIAM A. ALLEY, THOMAS E. REILLY & 0. LEHN FRANKE, SUSTAINABILITY OF
GROUND-WATER RESOURCEs 3-4 (1999) ("[Gjround water is not a nonrenewable resource,
such as a mineral or petroleum deposit, nor is it completely renewable in the same manner
and timeframe as solar energy .... The term ground-water mining typically refers to a pro-
longed and progressive decrease in the amount of water stored in a ground-water system, as
may occur.., in heavily pumped aquifers in arid and semiarid regions.").
volume is renewed annually by precipitation,' that the levels re-
main relatively constant "with a normal fluctuation ranging from
30 to 60 cm (12-24 in.) in a single year,"' 0 and the levels are
"highly sensitive to climatic variability.""0 Second, the Report's sec-
tion on climate change synthesized the various projected, albeit
inconsistent, climate change scenarios and boldly opined that
"[c]limate change suggests that some lowering of water levels is
likely to occur .... [T]he Commission believes that considerable
caution should be exercised with respect to any factors potentially
reducing water levels and outflows.""
Third, the Report firmly placed management issues in the con-
text of international law. Not only did it discuss the Boundary
Waters Treaty and the need for precaution, but it also ventured an
opinion on the applicability of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT)" 2 and the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) " 3 to any restrictions on diversions. Since the late
1990s, environmental NGOs, especially Canadian nationalist
greens, have raised the argument that either the Dormant Com-
merce Clause of United States Constitution" 4 or international
trade law will preempt state and provincial control of diversions.
The basic argument is that any regime that allows some diversions
will "commodify" the Lakes, opening them up to the challenge that
an environmental regime which severely limits diversions is simply
a disguised discriminatory trade practice."5 This fear has also bro-
ken out in the United States, causing some states to act like
mythical Balkan republics in Viennese operettas, making heroic
but ineffective gestures. For example, in 2005, the Governor of
Michigan ordered state officials to block a proposal by Nestle to
withdraw spring water for bottled water sales unless Nestle could
prove that the bottles would be sold exclusively within the Basin."6
108. INTERNATIONALJOINT COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 5.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 6.
111. Id. at 21-22.
112. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 UN T.S.
194.
113. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993).
114. See ANNIN, supra note 10 at 218-23; Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S.
941 (1982) (holding groundwater is an article of commerce and thus the Commerce Clause
invalidates a flat state prohibition on the interstate export of water).
115. See SUNGJOON CHO, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL REGULATION: A REFORM AGENDA
OF THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 45-50 (2003).
116. Peter Luke, Great Lakes States Circle the Wagons on Fresh Water, GRAND RAPIDS PREss,
July 10, 2005, at B3. This incredible anti-commodity argument was made in litigation
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Thus, I could not buy a bottle of water in a supermarket a mile west
of my home because I would have crossed into the Mississippi wa-
tershed.
The Report identified the key legal issue as whether water in its
natural state is a product or good for purpose of trade law and
concluded that raw water that has not yet entered the stream of
commerce is not a product or good.1 7 This conclusion was purely
advisory, but the Report helped strengthen the resolve of the eight
Basin states and two Canadian provinces to proceed with a man-
agement regime that made it difficult if not impossible to divert
water outside of the basin in the face of possible U.S. Constitu-
tional and international trade law objections. The question of
whether water in its natural state is a product or good under GATT
or NAFTA is an open and complex one, but subsequent analyses
have confirmed the IJC's analysis."8
The Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC) pro-
vides another example of the benefits of an international body with
the courage to raise broader issues in the face of the constraints of
domestic politics. The CEC was created by a 1992 environmental
side agreement to NAFTA." 9 Articles 14 and 15 of the Agreement
create a citizens submission process. 1 Any citizen of one of the
challenging Perrier's planned diversion of spring waters in Michigan. Mich. Citizens for
Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc., No. 01-14563, slip op. (Mecosta County
Cir. Ct. 2003), aff'd on other grounds, 709 N.W.2d 174 (2005), leave granted 722 N.W.2d 422
(2006). The reasonable use rule of groundwater limits use to overlying land and the
opponents of the plan argued that when groundwater is used to produce commodities, the
commodities can only be consumed on the overlying land. Id. The trial court rejected the
argument. Id.
117. INTERNATIONALJOINT COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 26-27.
118. After a careful analysis of the issue, a leading international environmental law law-
yer, Professor Edith Brown Weiss, concluded:
it is essential to consider that water is different from other natural resources. It is a
unique resource .... Thus, it would be prudent to adopt an approach of "anticipa-
tory caution," to strike the appropriate balance between the need to conserve water
resources and the need to ensure a level playing field in trading relationships. Antici-
patory caution means that in the face of uncertainty about the future, a country
should be able to exercise its sovereign authority to maintain its fresh water resources
without having to convince the trade community of the legitimacy of its actions.
Edith Brown Weiss, Water Transfers and International Trade Law, in FRESH WATER AND INTER-
NATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 61, 83 (Edith Brown Weiss et al. eds., 2005).
119. John H. Knox & David L. Markell, The Innovative North American Commission for En-
vironmental Cooperation, in GREENING NAFTA THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 276 (David L. Markell &John H. Knox eds., 2003).
120. COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION OF NORTH AMERICA, BRINGING
FACTS TO LIGHT: A GUIDE TO ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON




three NAFTA countries can allege that the country has failed to
effectively enforce an existing environmental law. If the Commis-
sion accepts a submission, it may decide to prepare a Factual
Record.2 ' However, a vote of two of the three environmental minis-
ters that make up the CEC Council is required both to prepare and
to release a record.122 Factual records can only spotlight non-
enforcement; they can neither reach conclusions of fact or law nor
recommend a remedy.12 3 The hope is that the "facts" disclosed in
the record will shame the government into enforcement and re-
medial actions. There are many problems with the CEC process,1
2 4
but it has disclosed important domestic enforcement failures and
put some of them in an international context. The CEC's Factual
Record in the Tarahumara Submission investigated allegations that
Mexico failed to effectively enforce various laws designed to pre-
vent illegal logging in indigenous communities in the northern
state of Chihuahua. 125 Over the objections of both Mexico and the
United States, the Factual Record included a United Nations
Commission on Human Rights report, which detailed how the sur-
vival of indigenous communities was threatened by Mexico's
inability to enforce and dispense justice, including the prevention
of illegal logging.'
2 6
The very strength of an international body is also often its weak-
ness because of the ease with which it may be silenced. An
international body may have a separate legal personality as a mat-
ter of international law, but ultimately it can only be as effective
and forward-looking as the nations that staff and fund it allow it to
be. This dilemma is a real problem of Canada-U.S. bodies; the
smaller the client base, the more vulnerable the body is to the vicis-
situdes of domestic politics. The IC is very much a creature of the
two governments but has been able to broaden the policy dialogue
on the Boundary Waters Treaty because Canada sees the interna-
tional nature of the Commission as a useful counter to the
121. Id.
122. Id. at 41-42.
123. Id. at 1 ("A factual record outlines, in as objective a manner as possible, the history
of the issue, the obligations of the Party under the law in question, the actions of the Party
in fulfilling those obligations, and the facts relevant to the assertions made in the submission
....).
124. See infra text accompanying notes 130-135.
125. COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION OF NORTH AMERICA, FINAL FAc-
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asymmetric power relationship with the United States.1 2 ' The bot-
tom line is that both countries only resort to the IJC when it is
useful and bypass it when political considerations have so dictated.
Its role has been described as "a kind of residual claimant on the
issues, a place for the federal governments to turn after a conflict
has been reduced to a technical issue or where the IJC's study role
can serve as a step toward achieving [a] political result.'
2s
Efforts to limit the modest fact finding mission of the CEC Sub-
missions Unit illustrate the risks when a small group of clients join
a race to the bottom.12 As previously stated, unlike the IJC, the
CEC does not enjoy the credibility and legitimacy that the ICJ has
built up over almost 100 years. The CEC Submissions Unit may re-
quest permission from the CEC Council, made up of the three
NAFTA country environmental ministers, to prepare a Factual Re-
cord.20 This important but weak experiment in an alterative
enforcement mechanism has triggered opposition in all three
countries, even though they are free to ignore the entire process.
Canada and the United States were supposed to be the counter-
weight to Mexico's anticipated objection to being the primary
object of scrutiny, given its poor environmental record.'' This as-
sumption occurred to a large extent as the bulk of the submissions
and factual records come from Mexico. 3 2 However, as submissions
begin to expose the weaknesses of environmental enforcement in
Canada, and to a lesser extent in the United States, the three na-
tions have begun to act in concert to curb the Commission's power.
For example, the Commission has tried to use the Factual Record
process to focus on cases of non- or under-enforcement of envi-
127. See Brun6e, supra note 89, at 617.
128. David J. Allee, Subnational Governance and the International Joint Commission: Local
Management of United States and Canadian Boundary Waters, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 133, 133
(1993).
129. The author wishes to disclose that since 1998 he has been a Special Legal Advisor
to the Submissions Unit. All matters discussed in this Essay are a matter of public record and
any opinions about the CEC are his alone and do not reflect the views of the CEC staff or
the parties to the environmental side agreement.
130. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation art. 15, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480.
131. See generally David L. Markell, The CEC Citizen Submissions Process: On or Off Course?
in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERA-
TION 276 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003) (tracing the fears of
underenforcement in Mexico and the role of U.S. NGOs in pushing for a tri-lateral over-
sight body).
132. As of February 2007, the CEC reports that it has closed forty-seven files, with
twenty-three of the submissions coming from Mexican NGOs. Current Status of Filed Sub-
missions, http://www.cec.org/citizen/status/index.cfm?arlan=English (last visited Feb. 8,
2007). Eight of the twelve active submission files are from Mexican NGOs. Id.
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ronmental laws that represent a pattern and practice. 3 3 However,
the three nations have increasingly limited records to an account
of the specific instances of non-enforcement, rendering the origi-
nal purpose of the process 1 4 impotent by trivializing it.
IV. THE BENEFITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON DOMESTIC LAW
The possible benefits of international law on domestic law in-
clude the least of the three claimed benefits of "internationalizing"
the Lakes. In addition, international law could strengthen U.S.
domestic regulation regimes and provide an additional basis to re-
ject trade law and Dormant Commerce Clause challenges. Two
possible examples are described below.
A. The Proposed Compact and International Law
The Boundary Waters Treaty is incorporated into the Proposed
Compact. Section 8.2 provides in part, "[n]othing in this Compact
is intended to infringe nor shall be construed to infringe upon the
treaty power of the United States of America, nor shall any term
hereof be construed to alter or amend any treaty or term thereof
that has been or may hereafter be executed by the United States"
and "[n] othing in this Compact is intended to affect nor shall be
construed to affect the application of the Boundary Waters Treaty
of 1909 whose requirements with respect to boundary waters con-
tinue to apply in addition to the requirements of this Compact.
135
A similar provision appears in the proposed Agreement.
3 6
Thus, remote as the possibility is, Canada could thus challenge a
diversion decision approved by the Great Lakes governors as a vio-
lation of the Treaty. The diversion would have to lower the level of
133. See, e.g., COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION OF NORTH AMERICA, Fi-
NAL FACTUAL RECORD FOR SUBMISSION SEM-99-002 (2003), http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/
sem/MigratoryBirds-FFR_.EN.pdf. U.S. NGOs alleged that the federal government systemati-
cally refused to protect migratory birds by regulating logging and other habitat destruction
practices. Id. Council Resolution 01-10 limited the factual record to two documented cases
of the destruction of nests as the result of logging. WEISS ET AL., supra note 47, at 230. See
generally Markell, supra note 131 (providing a comprehensive collection of papers assessing
the efforts of CEC to promote environmental protection in the three NAFTA countries).
134. See Teseming Yang, The Effectivness of the NAFIA Environmental Side Agreement's Citizen
Submission Process: A Case Study of Metales y Derivados, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 443, 458-76 (2005).
135. Id., § 8.2.
136. See AGREEMENT, supra note 1, art. 701.
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boundary water in Canada, and thus the burden of proof would be
high. 137
During the process of negotiating the proposed Agreement and
Compact, the states ignored the Boundary Waters Treaty. However,
the U.S. Department of State appears to have insisted on the inclu-
sion of Section 8.2. Article VI of the U.S. Constitution makes
treaties, along with federal law, the supreme law of the land. 38 If
the Compact is ratified by Congress, as the Constitution requires, 1
9
and signed by the President, it becomes federal law.'4 Under fed-
eral law, treaties and federal statutes, including ratified compacts,
are of equal dignity and the most recently enacted controls in case
of conflicts."' However, the Draft Compact abrogates this rule and
makes the Boundary Waters Treaty superior to the Compact.'
42
B. Trade Law Challenges
A formal international law agreement between Canada and the
United States might also make it more difficult to challenge an
anti-diversion regime as illegal under the GATT or NAFTA. 43 Ca-
nadian nationalist greens have argued that a ban on diversions
might be illegal under the GATT.1" This argument makes the
doubtful assumption that water in its natural state is a product un-
der GATT or NAFTA. Were "raw" water to be classified as a
product,4 5 one of the issues that would arise in a state-to-state
World Trade Organization (WTO) challenge is the relevance of
multi-lateral environmental agreements that use trade bans as an
137. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 14, at 2450. Articles II and III of the Boundary
Waters Treaty require either proof of injury or a lowered lake level. Id. at 2449-50.
138. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
139. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Congressional ratification of water resources compacts is
the universal norm, but the Supreme Court has suggested that Congressional ratification is
only necessary where a compact increases the political power of states at the expense of the
federal government. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 518 (1893). The proposed Com-
pact clearly meets this standard. It gives states the power to manage waters that the federal
government could manage under the Commerce Clause, and it allows states to make deci-
sions that are constitutionally suspect under the dormant commerce power because the
definition of water in Section 1.2 subjects navigable surface waters under federal control to
state regulation.
140. States may not invoke state constitutional defenses to compliance. West Virginia ex
rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951); see also Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564
(1983) (stating that interpretation is a federal question).
141. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 115 (1987).
142. COMPACT, supra note 2, § 8.2(3).
143. See generally MAUDE BARLOW & TONY CLARKE, BLUE GOLD: THE FIGHT TO STOP THE
CORPORATE THEFT OF THE WORLD'S WATER (2002).
144. SeeANNIN, supra note 10 at 218-23.
145. See Weiss, supra note 118, at 76-85.
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enforcement tool. WTO jurisprudence is currently unclear and
contradictory. The decision of the Appellate Body in the Shrimp-
Turtle dispute146 found that such agreements were relevant and
should be considered in evaluating trade restrictions. However, the
2006 Panel Report in the EC-Biotech case (Argentina v. European
Commission) came to a different but distinguishable conclusion.
47
The interim Panel refused, without explanation, to accept the EC's
reliance on the Conventions on Biological Diversity and Biosafety
for its "risk not disproved" formulation of the precautionary prin-
ciple.' 48 However, the two cases are sufficiently distinguishable to
support the argument that relevant multi or bi-lateral treaties can
provide the basis for the WTO to conclude that a measure is not
illegal under the GATT.
The international nature of the protection regime might also
provide another argument that the anti-export ban does not violate
the Dormant Commerce Clause. In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that groundwater was an exploitable article of commerce and
invalidated a Nebraska statute that prohibited the use of water on a
farm that straddled Colorado and Nebraska. 49 The specter of judi-
cial invalidation of a regional export ban under the Dormant
Commerce Clause has been a persistent fear of proponents of the
regime.5 0 If the Proposed Compact is ratified, it should clear up
any doubts that Congress has validly exercised its power to waive
the Dormant Commerce Clause.'' However, the argument persists
that courts retain the power to scrutinize congressionally approved
compact waivers under the Dormant Commerce Clause.5 5 A large-
scale anti-international ecosystem conservation regime that is sup-
ported by both a domestic inter-state region and by Canada
provides a strong argument for a court to conclude that this is not
the type of discriminatory legislation that requires judicial policing.
146. United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Nov. 6,
1998,38 I.L.M. 121.
147. Panel Report, supra note 90. In November 2006, the EU announced that it
would not appeal the Panel decision. EU ACCEPTS TRADE RULING ON GMOs,
www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-accepts-trade-ruling-gmos/article-159918.
148. Panel Report, supra note 90.
149. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941,954 (1982).
150. See HENRYJ. HENDERSON, TOWARD SUSTAINABLE GOVERNANCE OF THE WATERS OF
THE GREAT LAKES BASIN 17-19 (2001), http://www.policysolutionsltd.com/wateressay2.pdf.
151. See Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 590 F. Supp. 293, 295-
96 (D. Mont. 1983), aff'd, 769 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986); see
also FrankJ. Trelease, Interstate Use of Water--"Sporhase v. El Paso, Pike & Vermejo", 22 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 315, 339 (1987).
152. Douglas L. Grant, State Regulation of Interstate Water Export, in 4 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 48.03(c) (6) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991).
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CONCLUSION
The suggestion that international environmental law has a role
to play in the future management of the Great Lakes may strike
many as fanciful for at least two reasons. First, the states and prov-
inces have constructed a strong and effective anti-diversion regime
within a loose bi-national regime. Second, the weaknesses of inter-
national environmental law, such as the difficulty of enforcing
norms and the tendency to seek the lowest common denominator
standards, make a strong national or bi-national regime an attrac-
tive alternative. However, the Great Lakes states and provinces
need to be sensitive to the international environmental law dimen-
sion of the regime. International law can both re-enforce domestic
and bi-national protection efforts and remind the basin states,
provinces, and nations of the broader context of the proposed di-
version control regime. The proposed Great Lakes protection
regime may be a rare case of having one's cake and eating it too:
the littoral states and provinces will be able to control the destiny
of the region at the same time that they give a valuable gift to the
planet. Viewing the Lakes as a common heritage of humankind is a
valuable precedent for other stressed aquatic ecosystems such as
Lake Baikal in Russia, a minimally restored Aral Sea in Central
Asia, the Colorado Delta in Mexico, and many others.
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